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gree did not constitute marital property
under § 8-201(e) of the Maryland Marital
Property Act since it had "no exchange
value on the open market." Id. at 591.
The court then turned its attention to
the instant issue, noting first that various
courts have considered the same issue with
varying results. The court undertook a
case by case analysis of the question. The
court noted that while some courts have
completely rejected the argument that a
personal injury award or settlement is
marital property, other courts have concluded that a personal injury case which is
pending at the time of divorce cannot be
marital property because ofits speculative
nature.
While the court was obviously swayed
by this argument, and relied heavily on it,
it is specious. The court has already allowed a nonvested pension right to be divided on a percentage basis, see Deer£ng v.
Deer£ng, supra at 891, and there is no reason why the same argument could not be
applied here.
The court then turned its attention to a
series of New Jersey cases which have addressed the issue. In D£Tolvo v. D£Tolvo,
131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (1974),
the court held that potential damages in a
personal injury case which occurred during marriage was a chose in action and, as
such, constituted marital property acquired
by the spouse during marriage and was
subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution of the marriage. D£Tolvo was affirmed in Landwehr v. Landwehr, 200 N.J.
Super. 56, 490 A.2d 342 (1985).
Reaching a contrary decision was Amato
v. Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210,434 A.2d
639 (1981), another New Jersey intermediate appellate court case. Amato involved a spouse's unliquidated claim for
damages stemming from a medical malpractice case. The court concluded that
the damages were "peculiar to the injured
person, to seek to be restored or made
whole as he was before the injury." 434
A.2d at 642. Therefore, the court concluded that the monies "represent personal
property of the injured spouse, not distributable under the New Jersey Marital
Property Statute." Id. at 643. The court
carved out an exception, however, for
losses which diminish the size of the marital estate, i.e. lost wages and medical expenses, holding that such monies were "distributable when recovered." Id. at 644.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in
Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675
P. 2d 1207 (1984), gave a more concise explanation of the above rationale when it
stated:
The physical injury to the spouse, and
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the pain and suffering of the spouse
therefrom is an injury to the spouse
as an individual ... but on the other
hand, if the injury deprives the marital
community of the earnings or services
of the spouse, that is an injury to the
marital community.
The court of appeals noted that Washington, unlike Maryland, is a community
property state, but stated that the basic
premise is the same: the focus is on the
costs incurred by the couple and whether
they reduced the size of the marital estate.
The court of appeals then turned its attention to the Maryland case law analyzing
the Marital Property Statute, as well as the
Report of the Governor's Commission on
Domestic Relations Law (1978). After noting that the statute and case law call for the
court to consider both the monetary and
nonmonetary contributions when distributing property in a divorce, and that the
property rights of the spouses' be adjusted
fairly and equitably, the court noted that
the commission report explicitly noted
that the theory of equitable distribution is
that each spouse has a duty "to contribute
his or her best efforts to the marriage for
the benefit of the family unit." 305 Md.
at 587.
Given the above language, the court
goes on to announce its holding in the instant case. In one paragraph the court
states that since the claim was not "acquired" during the marriage, and arose by
purely fortuitous circumstances . . .
the claim is simply not the type of resource contemplated by the statutory
definition of marital property even
though, in part at least, payment of the
claim would produce monies which
would replenish marital assets previously diminished through payment of
medical expenses and the loss of wages.
Id. at 587
In announcing such a broad reaching decision the court of appeals has gone further
than most courts which have come down
on the same side of the issue. In Maryland,
according to the court, not even lost wages
or medical expenses which were originally
paid out of the marital estate may be replenished by an award from a personal injury case.
Given the facts of the instant case, i.e.
that the parties were separated at the time
of the accident, and that the wife incurred
none of the expenses of the accident, the
court probably reached an equitable decision. However, the court could have accomplished this without dealing with the
more complex issue presented here by ruling that under § 8-205 (8) of the Maryland

Family Law Article that Gypsy had not
contributed to this specific piece of marital
property. In addition, § 8-205 (10) allows
the court to consider "any other factor that
the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair
and equitable monetary award."
The court has left us with what may be a
classic example of bad facts making bad
law. By expanding its decision as far as it
did, the court may have reached a decision
that will be difficult to reconcile given different facts. One can picture a scenario
wherein a spouse is injured while living
with his/her husband/wife and expends
great sums of otherwise marital property
during the recovery process. By delaying
settlement in the personal injury case, the
injured spouse could conceivably deplete
marital funds and later receive a windfall.
Given the previous case law in the area,
this does not appear to be a result the court
of appeals would desire.
- W£lHam Cassara

Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.:
INSURANCE COMPANIES'
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
WITH ATTORNEY CONTINGENCY
FEE CONTRACTS: A BROADER
RULE
In Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual Automob£le Insurance Co., 306 Md. 754, 511
A.2d 492 (1986) the Maryland Court of
Appeals, reversing the court of special appeals, held, in a case of first impression,
that an attorney stated a cause of action
against an insurer for tortious interference
with contract by alleging that the insurer
had capitalized on his client's need for
money by involving the client in settlement
negotiations.
The client, Donald Zorbach, was involved in an automobile accident with
another automobile insured by State Farm
and suffered personal injuries. Zorbach retained Ronald M. Sharrow as his attorney
where, pursuant to a written agreement,
Sharrow was to receive a specified percentage upon settlement or a slightly
greater percentage ifsuit was filed. During
his representation by Sharrow, Zorbach ran
into serious financial difficulties and requested that Sharrow advance him money.
Sharrow declined stating that it is unethical for an attorney to advance money to his
client and also stated that it would be unwise to approach State Farm with a similar
request. Against his attorney's advice and
without his knowledge, Zorbach contacted
State Farm and requested an advance on

his claim. State Farm refused and instead
negotiated a settlement of Zorbach's claim
for $2,500. Zorbach was directed to go to
State Farm's office to execute certain documents to finalize the settlement. Zorbach
went to the office and signed a release as
directed. Zorbach was also requested to
execute a document discharging Sharrow
as his attorney and stating that he had advised Sharrow of his intention to settle directly with State Farm.
Sharrow filed a three count complaint
against State Farm and two of its employees, alleging that they tortiously interfered with his contingent fee contract by
negotiating and settling the claim directly
with Zorbach. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim and
Sharrow appealed. Sharrow contended that
he adequately stated a cause ofaction which
averred that State Farm, knowing ofSharrow's representation of Zorbach, sensed
Zorbach's desperate need for money when
he contacted the insurer for an "advance" on
his pending claim; that the insurer "seized
the opportunity to exploit Zorbach's financial plight and induced a settlement"; and
that "the egregious nature of State Farm's
conduct was compounded by its requirement that Zorbach execute documents it
prepared which falsely stated that he had
terminated Sharrow as his attorney and
had advised Sharrow that he intended to
deal directly with State Farm." Sharrow
reasserted the same allegations against a
claims adjuster at State Farm who was assigned to Zorbach's claim. Sharrow asserted that the claims adjuster further interfered with Sharrow's contract rights by
stating to Zorbach that since it was Zorbach, not Sharrow, that settled the claim,
Sharrow should not receive a fee for legal
seryices. Sharrow stated that the claims adjuster's actions were undertaken by her
solely to deprive Sharrow of the benefit of
his contract. Sharrow contended that State
Farm's conduct was coercive and malicious
and that Zorbach's termination of the contract was induced by State Farm's "opprobrious conduct and misrepresentations."
The court of special appeals in Sharrow
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 63 Md. App. 412, 492A.2d 977(1985),
citing Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289
Md. 313,329,424 A.2d 744(1981), recognized the general proposition that a third
party who, without legal justification, intentionally interferes with the rights of a
party to a contract, or induces a breach
thereof, is liable in tort to the injured contracting party. However, the Maryland
appellate courts had not had occasion to
consider whether that tort applied to professional service agreements between attorney and client and, if so, what type of

conduct would suffice to create liability.
Although a different rule had been adopted
in a minority of states, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland saw no reason why
attorney-client agreements should be regarded differently in the eyes of the law
than other contracts which are protected
against tortious interference by third
parties. The problem was not whether
attorney-client agreements should be included within the aegis of the tort, but in
determining whether particular conduct
by a third party is actionable.
Upon analysis of the out-of-state cases
supporting the view that attorney-client
agreements do come within the aegis of the
tort, the intermediate appellate court noted
that liability was predicated "upon fraudulent or unconscionable conduct that actually induced the claimant to dismiss his or
her attorney and settle directly with the insurer." 63 Md. App. at 421.
The court looked to Comment a of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977)
which emphasizes that for the acts or statements to be actionable in tortious interference with contract, they must be "improper"; and under § 767 a chief factor in
determining whether an act is improper is
the nature of the conduct, e.g., "physical
violence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
threats of illegal conduct which are ordinarily wrongful means" and thus actionable. The Restatement analysis is not
whether the person is justified in causing
the harm, but whether he is justified in the
manner in which he does it.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland left no doubt that a client has the good
faith right to settle his cause of action without his attorney's knowledge or consent
notwithstanding the existence of a contingency fee contract. The court looked to
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269
(1967), which held an insurer liable where
it had the opportunity to settle a claim on
behalf of its insured within the policy limits but did not do so. In White the court applied a good faith test in determining the
liability of the insured. For an insurer to
measure up to the good faith test, its action
in refusing to settle must consist of an informed judgment based on honesty and
diligence.Id. at 333. Just as a claimant has
a right to settle his claim with an insurer,
White indicates that an insurer has a right,
and where reasonable and possible, a duty
to settle a claim made against its insured.
The court of special appeals in Sharrow
attempted to define the restraint. imposed
on the insurer's duty by stating that:
If, to achieve its own ends, an insurer
deliberately induces the claimant to

repudiate his retainer agreement by
means of threats, misrepresentations,
or other coercive or unconscionable
conduct, its 'right to settle' cannot save
it from liability to the lawyer who has
suffered economic detriment from the
repudiation. 63 Md. App. at 424.
Therefore, if a claimant indicated to an
insurer his willingness to settle without
the intervention of his attorney and the insured responds in good faith to settle the
claim, as its duty may well require, without engaging in coercive or unconscionable
conduct, there would be no improper interference with the attorney's contract.
U sing that analysis, the court of special
appeals agreed with the lower court in
finding that Sharrow failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Assuming the allegations of the complaint to
be true, that decision was made in light of
the fact that false statements existed in the
settlement agreement. The court summarily dismissed the effect of the false statement-the certificate that Zorbach had
discharged Sharrow - by noting the fact
that the statement became true the instant
it was signed. The other false statement
that, "I have advised Ronald Sharrow of
my intention to settle my claim directly ..."
was dismissed because there was no allegation that it had anything to do with inducing Zorbach to settle his claim. The allegation that a claims adjuster told Zorbach
he would not have to pay Sharrow was determined to have no basis ofliability. The
court indicated that because the statement
came after Zorbach signed the agreement,
it had nothing to do with inducing him to
settle with State Farm.
The court of appeals in Sharrow agreed
with the court of special appeals' analysis
of the applicability of tortious interference
with contract to attorney-client contracts,
the right of claimants to settle their claims,
and the duty of insurers to settle claims
against its insured, but did not agree with
the standard used to assess the conduct of
an interfering third party. The court of
special appeals' standard for actionable
conduct was, that an act must be either
egregious, opprobrious, fraudulent, coercive, or unconscionable and manifested
by threats, misrepresentations or other acts
or statements made to induce the client to
repudiate his contract and settle with the
insurer. 306 Md. at 767. The court ofappeals held that standard to be too restrictive. The court enunciated a broader rule
which defines as actionable any purposeful conduct, however subtle, by which an
insurer improperly and intentionally induces or persuades a client to discharge his
counsel and settle directly. 306 Md. at
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767. After this rule, the conduct of the insurer need no longer be opprobrious or unconscionable in nature, but only intentional
with an underlying improper purpose of
inducing a client to settle directly with the
insurer.
The court reversed the court of special
appeals but admitted that it did so only because Sharrow barely alleged a claim for
tortious interference with contract. Sharrow, on the basis of the broader rule, although lacking specificity, alleged the elements necessary to sustain: the tort claim.
Based on the facts and the court's analysis,
it is highly unlikely that Sharrow had what
was needed to prove the commission of
tortious interference with contract. The
court, however, supplied practitioners,
who may find themselves victims of an interference with contract, with the ammunition necessary to actually prove the tort.
The court emphasized that the determinative factor in such cases is whether
there was purposeful conduct by the insurer, or whether such conduct was by the
client. If the facts of Sharrow's case showed
that State Farm rather than Zorbach actually initiated the settlement negotiations,
the purposeful conduct of State Farm would
indeed be more substantial and the tort
claim more likely to succeed at trial. Also
absent from Sharrow's complaint was an
allegation that State Farm's purpose in negotiating directly with Zorbach was for its
own benefit. The presence of such an allegation would enhance the success of a claim
alleging the commission of the tort and
certainly assist in proving the same.
The Sharrow case sends a message to insurance companies to tread lightly whenever they may be in a position of dealing
with a claimant directly. The insurer's
duty toward its insured, heretofore rather
ambiguous, does not extend to intentional
conduct, however subtle, whereby the insurer leads a claimant to discharge his attorney and settle his claim.

-Kevin S. Anderson

Knill v. Knill: HUSBAND MAY NOT
BE EQUITABLY ESTOPPED
TO DENY CHILD SUPPORT
The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel
may not be applied to estop a husband
from denying support to an illegitimate
child born to his wife by another man during the marriage, unless the husband's
voluntary conduct in treating the child as
his own gives rise to reliance by the child
upon such conduct and such conduct results in the child suffering financial loss.
12-The Law Forurn/Fa/~ 1986

Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546
(1986).
Charles and Cledythe Knill had been
married ten years. As a result of their marriage, two children were born. After the
birth of their children, Charles underwent
surgery for a full vasectomy. However, one
and a half years after the operation, Mrs.
Knill bore a third child, Stephen. Both
parties acknowledged that Stephen was
not Charles' son. According to Cledythe,
the natural father was a former co-worker.
Charles apparently forgave Cledythe for
her infidelity and the marriage continued
for twelve years with Stephen being reared
and supported as a member of the Knill
family. During this twelve year period,
Stephen had no knowledge of his illegitimacy. Charles was named as Stephen's father on his birth certificate. Additionally,
Stephen was treated as "one of the family"
and was thereby so known in the community where the family resided. In the aftermath of a family dispute, Cledythe revealed
to Stephen that Charles was not his natural father. Charles nevertheless continued to support Stephen for two years
until Cledythe sued for divorce. Among
her prayers for relief, Cledythe requested
child ·support for Stephen. The Circuit
Court for Frederick County held,that even
though Charles was not Stephen's natural
father, he was estopped from asserting the
illegitimacy of the child in order to avoid
child support.
On appeal, Charles argued that since he
was not Stephen's natural father he could
not be ordered to support Stephen. Maryland law places the responsibility of child
support squarely on the shoulders of natural parents. MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 15-703(b)(l) (1984). See also,
Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 794 Md. 183,448 A.2d
353 (1982). Charles asserted that he stood
in loco parentis during the twelve years that
he voluntarily supported him. Since this
relationship had been temporary in nature,
he owed no legal duty to continue to support Stephen. On the other hand, Cledythe
contended that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel should be applied to prevent an
inequitable and unconscionable result.
For the first time in Maryland, the court
of appeals had the opportunity to address
the applicability of equitable estoppel to a
child support proceeding. For the doctrine's to apply that a party claiming the
benefit of estoppel must have been misled
to his injury and changed his position for
the worse, having believed and relied on
the representations of the party sought to
be estopped. Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277
Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976). See also,
3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 804
(5th Ed. 1941).

In Knill, by a 4-3 decision, the court held
that a husband cannot be equitably estopped
to deny a duty to support. In reaching its
decision Judge Cole for .the majority reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions
which had previously addressed the issue.
While a few jurisdictions had held that
equitable estoppel is to be applied in order
to force child support, as in Clevenger v.
Clevenger, 189 Cal. App.2d 658, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 707 (1961) and the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J.
154,478 A.2d 351 (1984), the majority for
the court followed the holdings of the majority of jurisdictions which do not apply
the doctrine to estop a husband from denying paternity and a support obligation. See
e.g., Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn.
114, 479 A.2d 833 (1980); Weise v. Weise,
699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
The court in Knill stated that in order
for the doctrine ofequitable estoppel to apply, the related elements of representation,
reliance and detriment must be present.
The Court indicated that the application
of the three-element test requires that the
voluntary conduct or representation of the
party to be estopped must give rise to
the estopped party's reliance and, in turn,
result in detriment to the estopped party.
In applying the elements of equitable estoppel to the facts in Knill, the court found
the elements of representation and reliance to be present. The facts showed that
Charles represented to Stephen that he
was his father and these representations
were accepted and acted upon by the child.
[d. at 537, 510 A.2d at 551. The facts also
showed Stephen relied upon the representations and treated Charles as his father,
giving his love and affection to him in ignorance of the true facts. [d. In regard to
the element of detriment, the court stated,
[T]he evidence in this case~ however
fails to demonstrate any finimcial detriment incurred by Stephen as a result
of Charles's course of conduct during
their twelve year relationship ... if any
detriment was incurred by Stephen, it
was emotional and attributable to his
mother ... it was she who ripped the
'cloak of legitimacy' off the boy when
she revealed to him that Charles was
not his father.

Knill, at 537, 510 A.2d at 551. The court
concluded that since the elements of equitable estoppel were not satisfied, Charles
could not be held legally responsible for
child support.
For the dissent, Chief Judge Murphy,
opined, "I think the majority is dead
wrong." Id. at 539, 510 A.2d at 552. Murphy

